H igh-quality rural service delivery has been linked with higher economic growth and lower poverty and inequality (Azulai et al. 2014) and is essential for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Agricultural and livelihood services (including extension and water access), infrastructure (such as roads, electricity, clinics, and schools), social services (such as healthcare, education, and social protection), and even regulatory services (such as environmental and food safety) improve both the welfare of recipients and the economy and society as a whole through spillover benefits. For example, agricultural extension services train farmers to make better investments. And providing healthcare and ensuring food safety reduces the incidence of illness and makes workers more productive.
Access to these services has also been shown to raise individuals' goals and aspirations for the future-thus leading them to make costly but rewarding personal investments (Kosec and Mo 2017) .
Getting rural service provision right is critical, given that about 68 percent of the world's poor live in rural areas.
However, logistical and communications challenges in these areas can make service delivery difficult. Rural areas are often less integrated than the rest of the country, service providers lack information about what users want, and users are insufficiently informed about the mandates of providers.
In such environments, policymakers may take advantage of citizens' limited information (for example, by stealing public funds or shirking responsibilities), to the detriment of rural welfare (Kosec and Wantchekon 2020) .
The public sector is often the primary service provider, especially for the ultra poor. The private sector frequently lacks strong incentives to invest in and provide rural services, particularly in impoverished areas. If not well regulated, private sector investments are likely to be targeted toward more profitable areas and may intensify inequality in access to services, dangerously skew the market power and political influence of private companies, and increase environmental degradation. These factors point to an essential role for government in both providing and regulating rural service delivery.
In recent years, the rural landscape has also been changing in developing countries. Rural-urban linkages have increased, a more diverse set of actors is delivering services, and information and communication technologies are affecting both service delivery and government transparency and accountability.
KEY MESSAGES: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES AND INCENTIVES
• When the private sector can equitably and sustainably provide high-quality rural services, the public sector's role lies in creating an enabling environment for private sector provision.
• The public sector plays an important role in regulation, monitoring, and enforcement to support high-quality, equitable, and sustainable service provision.
• The public sector also plays a critical role in encouraging take-up of services, including through social protection programs-especially given spillover benefits from accessing services.
• Public and private service providers require strong incentives to deliver high-quality services, and to be effective, interventions meant to improve service delivery must carefully consider the incentive environment for providers.
• Both government service providers and service users require good information about users' preferences, government mandates (obligations), and actual investments made to ensure that public service provision benefits recipients and the economy and society as a whole. 
CREATING AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENTS
In some cases, the private sector can provide rural services, and do so equitably and sustainably. In such cases, the public sector should create an enabling environment for private provision. Private provision of extension services, often bundled with several other services such as input provision and marketing, has been successful in many settings and sectors, most notably for commercial commodities (Zhou and Babu 2015; Davis, Babu, and Ragasa 2019; Ragasa et al. 2017 Ragasa et al. , 2019a . These private firms fill a void left by major reductions in public expenditures on extension in recent decades. The private sector also successfully provides many other services. For example, privatization of water services across Africa has improved child health (Kosec 2014) . And in the area of food-safety regulatory services, private companies are signaling safe food with certification, branding, labeling, and traceability mechanisms that carry price premiums (Ragasa et al. 2019b ).
It is critical that government or donor projects do not crowd out private sector participation. Provision of inputs or services for free or at subsidized rates can distort market incentives. For example, in Ghana, agricultural development projects providing subsidized inputs or credit for the maize sector have been associated with lower participation in contract farming schemes and more frequent exits from contract farming (Lambrecht and Ragasa 2018 
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Source: Authors.
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization; CBO = community-based organization; FBO = farmer-based organization (these work at times in partnership with the public and/or private sectors to deliver rural services and respond to rural households' demands and preferences for these services). The ability and incentives of these actors-public, private, FBOs and NGOs, and rural citizens-to supply and demand services is affected by state and local capacity and policy and institutions that frame and condition these capacities and motivations. Arrows illustrate the flow of cash, goods and services, information, and accountability from/to providers and users of rural services.
THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S REGULATORY ROLE
Growing involvement of the private sector requires a greater regulatory and monitoring role for the public sector in protecting the livelihoods, safety, and welfare of citizens.
An enabling regulatory environment can also promote private sector investments. For example, Ghana's thriving aquaculture sector is threatened by weak enforcement of regulations on entry of foreign fish seeds into the country, which is causing fish diseases and mortality ). Poor enforcement of safety regulations for imported foods creates a large risk for many countries that are highly reliant on food imports. Private food-safety certification systems can work, but only when oversight and regulatory enforcement are effective (Ragasa et al. 2019b ).
Coordination among service providers is also crucial, and 
SOCIAL PROTECTION TO INCENTIVIZE CITIZEN TAKE-UP OF SERVICES
Beyond supply, individuals must also be persuaded to take While many of these platforms function poorly due to the limited motivation and capacity of service providers to respond to rural communities' demands, newer forms of innovation platforms that focus on market access and center on specific value chains have been successful in some cases (Ragasa, Badibanga, and Ulimwengu 2016) . In Ethiopia, Digital Green's Connect Online-Connect Offline platform, which regularly collects data and automatically computes relevant statistics on adoption and yields, provides relevant and timely data for decision-making and programming (Bernard et al. 2016) . In Rwanda, an approach combining elements of performance-based contracts for various actors, consultative platforms for greater accountability, earmarked funding, and capacity strengthening at all levels (from farmers' groups to local and state institutions) is successfully improving adoption and yields (Davis, Babu, and Ragasa 2019) . Three-party performance contracts between Rwandan district officials, the Rwanda Agricultural Board, and farmer field school facilitators' cooperatives are helping monitor the progress of field school facilitators.
This approach is combined with the imihigo system, a traditional consultative process for demand articulation and accountability. Finally, political competition also affects policymakers' motivations and incentives. In established democracies, highly contested political races can create electoral incentives that encourage policymakers to perform well. But in emerging democracies with low levels of transparency, political competition can actually worsen public goods provision; it makes it harder for politicians to work together and reach agreements about which goods to supply, where, and how (Gottlieb and Kosec 2019) . In such settings, policy changes-for example, the central government basing future transfers to local governments to some extent on their past performance in utilizing those funds-could incentivize politicians to collaborate even when it is challenging to do so.
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Ultimately, this could lead to improved rural service delivery.
INFORMATION AND TRANSPARENCY CAN IMPROVE SERVICE DELIVERY
Bringing about high-quality rural service delivery requires Information can strengthen electoral incentives in democracies; informed citizens can vote policymakers out of office if they fail to deliver, and governments are more likely to invest if they know their efforts will be visible. In addition to creating electoral incentives, information may also stimulate demand for public services. For example, if citizens know that by law the government must provide free and high-quality education to all children, they are more likely to ask for it at the ballot box or protest poor-quality education.
A systematic review of 48 empirical studies on information and rural service delivery in developing countries found that provision of information to either service users or service providers could improve service delivery (Kosec and Wantchekon 2020). However, information had these salutary effects if and only if the individuals receiving information perceived it to be relevant and if they had both the power and the incentives to act on it. 
CONCLUSIONS

